Germany Has Little Maneuvering Room in Ukraine Conflict
Jan 23, 2022 18:14:53 GMT
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Post by Deleted on Jan 23, 2022 18:14:53 GMT
Germany Has Little Maneuvering Room in Ukraine Conflict
A War of Nerves
Germany Has Little Maneuvering Room in Ukraine Conflict
The U.S. wants to impose harsh sanctions on Russia invades Ukraine. But the German government is putting on the brakes out of fears over the economic consequences and what punitive measures could mean for energy supplies for a country that gets much of its gas from Moscow.
By Markus Becker, Florian Gathmann, Matthias Gebauer, Kevin Hagen, Valerie Höhne, Martin Knobbe, Veit Medick, Jonas Schaible, Fidelius Schmid, Christoph Schult, Christian Teevs, Gerald Traufetter und Severin Weiland
To a certain degree, the visit was a conspiratorial one. No photo, no press release – and the first meeting was a small one. William Burns, the head of the CIA, first attended a meeting last week with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and his chief of staff Wolfgang Schmidt at the chancellor’s behest. Later, they were joined by Bruno Kahl, the head of Germany’s foreign intelligence service, the BND, and staff members from Scholz’s Chancellery. The head of America’s foreign intelligence agency told them bluntly that if Russia attacks Ukraine, the pressure on Berlin to take a clear stand against Moscow will increase.
Despite the friendly tone among the participants, it was by no means an easy meeting. Germany and the United States have been far apart on the issue of Russia for the past several weeks. Burns brought a trove of intelligence with him on troop movements and sabotage units to convince Berlin of the U.S. view of the Russian threat.
U.S. President Joe Biden also wanted to talk to the Germans – and offered Scholz a personal appointment in Washington at short notice. It would have been Scholz's inaugural visit to the U.S. and, more importantly, an opportunity for the two leaders to closely coordinate joint steps in the acute threat of war.
But Scholz reportedly declined, saying the next few days are already planned with travel and important meetings. Both are now looking for a new date. It’s possible the meeting won’t take place until the beginning or middle of February.
It’s rather difficult to fathom: Russia is building up the biggest threat since the end of the Cold War, deploying around 100,000 troops on the border with Ukraine, stationing tanks, artillery and rocket launchers, and the German chancellor is unable to clear his schedule to accept an invitation from the American president.
NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg during a visit with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Berlin Foto: Hannibal Hanschke / dpa
What else must happen to trigger a greater sense of urgency in Berlin? Is it not enough that Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to blackmail the West, issuing ultimatums and threatening military consequences if NATO doesn’t rule out Ukrainian membership in the alliance?
As if Putin hasn’t already shown the world with the occupation of Crimea that he doesn’t much care about international law. As if the Baltic states' worries were unfounded that they could face a similar situation to that of eastern Ukraine, where Russian leaders, with the help of loyal separatists, have been sabotaging the sovereignty of the government in Kyiv since 2014.
Western intelligence agencies and military officials believe the possibility of a Russian invasion is real, but the parties united in the coalition government in Berlin have shown a recent preference for emphasizing what leverage they are not interested in using against Moscow. Excluding Russia from the SWIFT international payment system? Not a great idea, they say, because it would also affect the German economy. Weapons deliveries to Ukraine? Purportedly incompatible with German arms export guidelines. Putting a stop to Moscow’s prestigious Nord Stream 2 pipeline project that could increase direct Russian gas exports to Germany and Europe? It shouldn't be "lumped together" with Russia’s Ukraine policy, says Kevin Kühnert, the secretary general of the chancellor’s center-left Social Democratic Party.
It’s true that no one knows exactly what Putin's goal is right now – whether he’s trying to gain ground diplomatically with the help of military threats or if he is planning a military operation under the pretext of a lack of concessions from the West. Within Chancellor Scholz’s SPD, there is a strong tendency to downplay the threat of war. Many within the SPD, but also within the Green Party, share the Kremlin’s opinion that Russia had been deceived during the eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union.
Still, the Germans’ wavering course weakens the strategy of Berlin's Western allies – a strategy aimed at driving the price of a military attack "as high as possible," as one EU official puts it. And the window of opportunity to deter Putin could close soon, one senior NATO diplomat told DER SPIEGEL. Once Putin had made the decision to attack Ukraine internally, he would hardly be able to back down without weakening his domestic political position, the diplomat says. That’s why it is crucial for the EU, the U.S. and NATO to act as united and resolutely as possible. Any hesitation could be interpreted by the Russian president as a signal that he can take the next step.
The message from Washington, meanwhile, is that deterrence only works if you don’t take any options off the table. The Americans’ view is that those options include arms deliveries to Ukraine and the threat of maximal sanctions. But the German government is tapping the brakes on both fronts.
On Monday, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock traveled to Kyiv. Since taking office, Baerbock says, nothing has taken as much of her attention as Ukraine's security – before once again ruling out arms deliveries of any kind to her Ukrainian hosts. For now, Baerbock isn’t prepared to break with Green Party principles in the way that Green Party éminence grise Joschka Fischer did back when he was foreign minister and dared to back the German military deployment to Kosovo. Germany’s restrictive arms policy is well known, said Baerbock, who is also co-chair of the Green party. "I don't change my position based on where I am at the moment," she said.
It’s an issue that divides the party. On the one hand, the Greens arose out of peace movements – it’s part of their founding myth. On the other, you have a Green politician like Robert Habeck who was calling for defensive weapons deliveries to Ukraine as far back as May. "I think it is hard to deny Ukraine weapons for defense, for self-defense," the party co-chair told German public radio station Deutschlandfunk at the time. He had reportedly coordinated his comments with other key foreign policy politicians
But resistance was strong. Jürgen Tritten, a veteran Green member of parliament, said the proposal would contradict the principle of not delivering weapons to war zones. Trittin has since become the foreign policy point man for his parliamentary group, but nothing has changed in terms of his categorical rejection of arms deliveries. He told DER SPIEGEL that the "entire German government” considers arms deliveries to Ukraine to be a mistake. Moreover, he says, there is no distinction between defensive and offensive weapons. "You shouldn’t fool yourself or others about that."
Hannah Neumann, a Green member of the European Parliament, on the other hand, argues that supplies of protective equipment could definitely be negotiated in the event of a Russian attack, but "before we discuss defensive weapons, we first need to know what Ukraine specifically wants," she told DER SPIEGEL. Sergey Lagondinsky, also a member of the European Parliament from the party, is more forceful. "We can’t be the neutral arbiter when one country unilaterally threatens another," he says. "The only way to avoid military escalation is to credibly demonstrate that there will be consequences. You can do that with help for self-defense, such as with defensive weapons."
Russia’s threats have also triggered a debate within the other junior government coalition partner in Berlin, the business-friendly Free Democratic Party (FDP). As recently as Jan. 11, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, the FDP chair of the Defense Committee in the Bundestag, Germany’s federal parliament, attempted to skirt the thorny issue by pointing to the coalition agreement of the previous government, led by the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU). In that agreement, the coalition parties agreed to rule out weapons deliveries to crisis areas, and "Ukraine is one of them." Now, though, fewer than 10 days later, Strack-Zimmermann no longer sounds quite as firm. She is now calling for the consideration of "defensive weapons" for Ukraine.
Still, there isn’t yet a clearly discernible position within the FDP. Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, the party’s foreign policy expert in parliament, says weapons deliveries are prohibited by the War Weapons Control Act. He also has difficulty with the concept of defensive weapons. If you look at the history of military conflict, he points out, these weapons could also be used for other purposes as well. He does say, however, that he supports deliveries of protective vests, helmets and night-vision equipment to Ukraine.
"A realistic foreign policy also includes putting all options on the table."
FDP General Secretary Bijan Djir-Sarai
But another FDP foreign policy expert, Bijan Djir-Sarai, who recently became the party’s designated secretary general, wants to at least discuss the possibility of arms deliveries. "A realistic foreign policy also includes putting all options on the table," he told DER SPIEGEL.
The strongest calls for arms deliveries come from the conservative CDU. It’s a little strange, though, considering that the Christian Democrats proved quite reserved on the issue when they were still the governing party until late last year. Johann Wadephul, the party’s deputy whip in parliament, says the previous position of rejecting arms deliveries to Kyiv is no longer tenable in view of the situation. The CDU’s foreign policy expert, Jürgen Hardt, believes Germany needs to send "more than just bandages."
Even incoming CDU party chair Friedrich Merz advocates giving consideration to arms deliveries to Ukraine.
The article you are reading originally appeared in German in issue 4/2022 (January 22nd, 2022) of DER SPIEGEL.
A War of Nerves
Germany Has Little Maneuvering Room in Ukraine Conflict
The U.S. wants to impose harsh sanctions on Russia invades Ukraine. But the German government is putting on the brakes out of fears over the economic consequences and what punitive measures could mean for energy supplies for a country that gets much of its gas from Moscow.
By Markus Becker, Florian Gathmann, Matthias Gebauer, Kevin Hagen, Valerie Höhne, Martin Knobbe, Veit Medick, Jonas Schaible, Fidelius Schmid, Christoph Schult, Christian Teevs, Gerald Traufetter und Severin Weiland
To a certain degree, the visit was a conspiratorial one. No photo, no press release – and the first meeting was a small one. William Burns, the head of the CIA, first attended a meeting last week with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and his chief of staff Wolfgang Schmidt at the chancellor’s behest. Later, they were joined by Bruno Kahl, the head of Germany’s foreign intelligence service, the BND, and staff members from Scholz’s Chancellery. The head of America’s foreign intelligence agency told them bluntly that if Russia attacks Ukraine, the pressure on Berlin to take a clear stand against Moscow will increase.
Despite the friendly tone among the participants, it was by no means an easy meeting. Germany and the United States have been far apart on the issue of Russia for the past several weeks. Burns brought a trove of intelligence with him on troop movements and sabotage units to convince Berlin of the U.S. view of the Russian threat.
U.S. President Joe Biden also wanted to talk to the Germans – and offered Scholz a personal appointment in Washington at short notice. It would have been Scholz's inaugural visit to the U.S. and, more importantly, an opportunity for the two leaders to closely coordinate joint steps in the acute threat of war.
But Scholz reportedly declined, saying the next few days are already planned with travel and important meetings. Both are now looking for a new date. It’s possible the meeting won’t take place until the beginning or middle of February.
It’s rather difficult to fathom: Russia is building up the biggest threat since the end of the Cold War, deploying around 100,000 troops on the border with Ukraine, stationing tanks, artillery and rocket launchers, and the German chancellor is unable to clear his schedule to accept an invitation from the American president.
NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg during a visit with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Berlin Foto: Hannibal Hanschke / dpa
What else must happen to trigger a greater sense of urgency in Berlin? Is it not enough that Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to blackmail the West, issuing ultimatums and threatening military consequences if NATO doesn’t rule out Ukrainian membership in the alliance?
As if Putin hasn’t already shown the world with the occupation of Crimea that he doesn’t much care about international law. As if the Baltic states' worries were unfounded that they could face a similar situation to that of eastern Ukraine, where Russian leaders, with the help of loyal separatists, have been sabotaging the sovereignty of the government in Kyiv since 2014.
Western intelligence agencies and military officials believe the possibility of a Russian invasion is real, but the parties united in the coalition government in Berlin have shown a recent preference for emphasizing what leverage they are not interested in using against Moscow. Excluding Russia from the SWIFT international payment system? Not a great idea, they say, because it would also affect the German economy. Weapons deliveries to Ukraine? Purportedly incompatible with German arms export guidelines. Putting a stop to Moscow’s prestigious Nord Stream 2 pipeline project that could increase direct Russian gas exports to Germany and Europe? It shouldn't be "lumped together" with Russia’s Ukraine policy, says Kevin Kühnert, the secretary general of the chancellor’s center-left Social Democratic Party.
It’s true that no one knows exactly what Putin's goal is right now – whether he’s trying to gain ground diplomatically with the help of military threats or if he is planning a military operation under the pretext of a lack of concessions from the West. Within Chancellor Scholz’s SPD, there is a strong tendency to downplay the threat of war. Many within the SPD, but also within the Green Party, share the Kremlin’s opinion that Russia had been deceived during the eastward expansion of NATO and the European Union.
Still, the Germans’ wavering course weakens the strategy of Berlin's Western allies – a strategy aimed at driving the price of a military attack "as high as possible," as one EU official puts it. And the window of opportunity to deter Putin could close soon, one senior NATO diplomat told DER SPIEGEL. Once Putin had made the decision to attack Ukraine internally, he would hardly be able to back down without weakening his domestic political position, the diplomat says. That’s why it is crucial for the EU, the U.S. and NATO to act as united and resolutely as possible. Any hesitation could be interpreted by the Russian president as a signal that he can take the next step.
The message from Washington, meanwhile, is that deterrence only works if you don’t take any options off the table. The Americans’ view is that those options include arms deliveries to Ukraine and the threat of maximal sanctions. But the German government is tapping the brakes on both fronts.
On Monday, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock traveled to Kyiv. Since taking office, Baerbock says, nothing has taken as much of her attention as Ukraine's security – before once again ruling out arms deliveries of any kind to her Ukrainian hosts. For now, Baerbock isn’t prepared to break with Green Party principles in the way that Green Party éminence grise Joschka Fischer did back when he was foreign minister and dared to back the German military deployment to Kosovo. Germany’s restrictive arms policy is well known, said Baerbock, who is also co-chair of the Green party. "I don't change my position based on where I am at the moment," she said.
It’s an issue that divides the party. On the one hand, the Greens arose out of peace movements – it’s part of their founding myth. On the other, you have a Green politician like Robert Habeck who was calling for defensive weapons deliveries to Ukraine as far back as May. "I think it is hard to deny Ukraine weapons for defense, for self-defense," the party co-chair told German public radio station Deutschlandfunk at the time. He had reportedly coordinated his comments with other key foreign policy politicians
But resistance was strong. Jürgen Tritten, a veteran Green member of parliament, said the proposal would contradict the principle of not delivering weapons to war zones. Trittin has since become the foreign policy point man for his parliamentary group, but nothing has changed in terms of his categorical rejection of arms deliveries. He told DER SPIEGEL that the "entire German government” considers arms deliveries to Ukraine to be a mistake. Moreover, he says, there is no distinction between defensive and offensive weapons. "You shouldn’t fool yourself or others about that."
Hannah Neumann, a Green member of the European Parliament, on the other hand, argues that supplies of protective equipment could definitely be negotiated in the event of a Russian attack, but "before we discuss defensive weapons, we first need to know what Ukraine specifically wants," she told DER SPIEGEL. Sergey Lagondinsky, also a member of the European Parliament from the party, is more forceful. "We can’t be the neutral arbiter when one country unilaterally threatens another," he says. "The only way to avoid military escalation is to credibly demonstrate that there will be consequences. You can do that with help for self-defense, such as with defensive weapons."
Russia’s threats have also triggered a debate within the other junior government coalition partner in Berlin, the business-friendly Free Democratic Party (FDP). As recently as Jan. 11, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, the FDP chair of the Defense Committee in the Bundestag, Germany’s federal parliament, attempted to skirt the thorny issue by pointing to the coalition agreement of the previous government, led by the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU). In that agreement, the coalition parties agreed to rule out weapons deliveries to crisis areas, and "Ukraine is one of them." Now, though, fewer than 10 days later, Strack-Zimmermann no longer sounds quite as firm. She is now calling for the consideration of "defensive weapons" for Ukraine.
Still, there isn’t yet a clearly discernible position within the FDP. Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, the party’s foreign policy expert in parliament, says weapons deliveries are prohibited by the War Weapons Control Act. He also has difficulty with the concept of defensive weapons. If you look at the history of military conflict, he points out, these weapons could also be used for other purposes as well. He does say, however, that he supports deliveries of protective vests, helmets and night-vision equipment to Ukraine.
"A realistic foreign policy also includes putting all options on the table."
FDP General Secretary Bijan Djir-Sarai
But another FDP foreign policy expert, Bijan Djir-Sarai, who recently became the party’s designated secretary general, wants to at least discuss the possibility of arms deliveries. "A realistic foreign policy also includes putting all options on the table," he told DER SPIEGEL.
The strongest calls for arms deliveries come from the conservative CDU. It’s a little strange, though, considering that the Christian Democrats proved quite reserved on the issue when they were still the governing party until late last year. Johann Wadephul, the party’s deputy whip in parliament, says the previous position of rejecting arms deliveries to Kyiv is no longer tenable in view of the situation. The CDU’s foreign policy expert, Jürgen Hardt, believes Germany needs to send "more than just bandages."
Even incoming CDU party chair Friedrich Merz advocates giving consideration to arms deliveries to Ukraine.
The article you are reading originally appeared in German in issue 4/2022 (January 22nd, 2022) of DER SPIEGEL.
Full article here: www.spiegel.de/international/world/a-war-of-nerves-germany-has-little-maneuvering-room-in-ukraine-conflict-a-faece2a7-c098-48cb-a9cc-cd0d5daf78f1
I would say NATO is more important than our gas. It is our most important alliance. If we have to freeze a bit for that, well, that shall be the price.
